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 A Two-Shock Model of the Impact of Crop Insurance on Input Use: 
 Analytic and Simulation Results 
Abstract 
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect 
farmer’s input use decisions. Ramaswami’s  (1993) one-shock (yield ) model analyzed 
the effect of the crop insurance on single input use by allowing the randomness of yield 
while keeping price constant in revenue determination. The total effect of actuarially fair 
insurance on input use was decomposed into risk reduction effect and moral hazard 
effect; the directions of the two effects were examined. He showed that the total impact 
of actuarially fair crop insurance on input use was a) to reduce it if the input was risk 
decreasing and b) indeterminate if the input was risk increasing. However, the evidence 
from previous empirical work has been mixed. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) 
suggested insured farmers raising corn use more fertilizers and pesticides while Smith 
and Goodwin (1996) obtained the opposite result for wheat. Smith and Goodwin also 
used more comprehensive econometric tests and had a higher quality data set. A common 
belief is that fertilizer is risk increasing and pesticide risk decreasing. 
         Ramaswami’s model assumed crop price was constant and yield was the only 
source of randomness in farmer’s revenue. In reality, market price is a random variable 
and often negatively correlated with the farmer’s yield. For example, bad weather 
conditions tend to reduce yield across farms in a common region, which may cause 
diminished quantities supplied and higher crop price.  
        Our paper extends Ramaswami’s one-shock model to a two-shock model, and 
generalizes the two propositions in that paper by introducing randomness to price as well 
as yield. With two random shocks, the total insurance effect on input use is indeterminate 
  2for both risk increasing and risk decreasing inputs, which is consistent with the mixed 
empirical evidence. Our study also provides a numerical method to decompose the total 
insurance effect into a risk reduction effect and a moral hazard effect using empirical 
data. The simulation based on 75 percent coverage level suggests the total insurance 
effect is economically small to the farmer for the current principal  individual farm / 
parcel  revenue insurance designs as are the risk reduction effect and moral hazard effect 
under mild risk aversion. And the moral hazard effect is less significant than the risk 
reduction effect. However, the moral hazard effect becomes larger if a higher coverage 




Crop insurance, including yield insurance and revenue insurance, is an essential risk 
management tool for the farmers in the United States. By altering the probability 
distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs also alter farmer’s decisions on 
input use. Ramaswami (1993) developed a single input model for the supply response to 
crop insurance. He decomposes the total effect of actuarially fair insurance on input 
decision into risk reduction effect and moral hazard effect, and analyzes the directions of 
the two effects. His analysis suggests that the total impact of actuarially fair crop 
insurance on input use is a) to reduce it if the input is risk decreasing and b) 
indeterminate if the input is risk increasing. The evidence of previous empirical work has 
been mixed. The study conducted by Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) suggests insured 
farmers use more fertilizers and pesticides. While Smith and Goodwin (1996) obtain the 
  3opposite result. It is the widely held belief that fertilizer is risk-increasing and pesticide is 
risk-decreasing. A closer examination of the theoretical model should be useful.  
 
Ramaswami’s model assumes crop price is constant and yield is the only resource of 
farmer’s revenue randomness. However, in the “real” world, price is random and 
sometimes negatively correlated with yield. For example, bad weather conditions tend to 
reduce yield in most farms in a common region, which may cause diminishing supply and 
higher crop price in local market. In this paper, Ramaswami’s one shock model is 
reviewed followed by an examination of whether the results change after introducing a 
random price shock. This analysis is followed by a simulation exercise to compute risk 
reduction effect and moral hazard effect under crop insurance using empirical yield 
response to nitrogen and price data. The result of the insurance provider’s 
maximumization decisions is assumed to be zero expected net profit; that is, competitive 
insurance markets (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Although viable competitive insurance 
markets for agriculture are not the norm (Chambers, 1989), this assumption can still be 
justified because most US crop insurance programs are subsidized by the government. 
 
One-Shock Model 
In Ramaswami’s Single Input Model, a single input x enters the production function 
described by  () θ , x q ,  . θ is a random production shock such that  . An input 
is either risk increasing or risk decreasing. For a risk increasing (decreasing) input, the 
marginal product q
0 > x q 0 > θ q
x is monotonic increasing (decreasing) in θ for all positive x. In an 
expected utility maximization framework, the two following propositions are derived: 
  4Proposition R1: For all constant and decreasing risk averse utility functions and for an 
actuarially fair insurance contract, risk reduction effect tends to increase risk-increasing 
input use and decrease risk-decreasing input use.  
Proposition R2: The moral hazard effect tends to reduce input use. So the total impact of 
actuarially fair crop insurance on input use is a) to reduce it if the input is risk decreasing 
and b) indeterminate if the input is risk increasing.  
Two-Shock Model 
The two-shock model maintains all the assumptions made in Ramaswami’s one-shock 
model, except that crop price described by  ( ) δ θ, p  is added explicitly into the model, 
where δ is a random price shock independent of θ, and  ,  0 > δ p 0 < θ p . Thus price and 
yield is negative correlated, and the dependence between them is only through θ. This is 
an appropriate assumption if farmers are small so that their individual input decisions do 
not affect the market price.  
 
A farmer’s optimal input decision is to solve the following expected utility maximization 
problem stated as 
(1)       
{} () () [] ( ) ( ) [ ] W x v wx x r EU x EU P I x Max
x
+ + − = = δ θ δ θ δ θ π η , , , , , , , ,  
subject to    0 ≥ x
where, 
I and P refers to indemnity and premium respectively, 
() . EU  refers to expected utility, 
() . π  refers to total wealth per acre, 
  5() δ θ, , x r  is farm’s revenue per acre, which equals ( ) ( ) θ δ θ , , x q p , 
w is input cost per acre, 
() δ θ, , x v  is the payoff from insurance, which equals indemnity minus premium, 
W is the farmer’s initial wealth per acre. 
 
In the case of no insurance, the first order condition (FOC) to the problem gives the 
optimal input level as follows, 
(2)          () ( ) [] ( ) ( ) 0 , cov 0 , 0 , = ′ + − ⋅ ′ = − ⋅ ′ = x x x x r U w r E U E w r U E x η  
Dividing both sides by  ,  x Er U E ⋅ ′
(3)        () () ()() 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
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The first term on the right hand side of (3) is a mean effect; the second term is a risk 
effect. Marginal utility is monotonic decreasing in θ and δ for concave utility functions. 
Marginal revenue is monotonic increasing in δ, and it is monotonic increasing 
(decreasing) in θ if the input is risk-increasing (decreasing). Consequently, risk averse 
level of input use is smaller than the risk-neutral level of input use if the input is risk-
increasing. The direction of risk-decreasing input use change depends on the coefficients. 
This result is slightly different from that in Ramaswami (1993). After adding a random 
price shock, risk averse level of input use gets smaller than that in Ramaswami case, no 
matter whether the input is risk-increasing or risk-decreasing. 
 
  6After entering an insurance program { } P I, , the FOC to solve the utility maximizing 
problem can be correspondingly stated as 
(4)         () ()() () ()





































− ) appears in (4). 
() premium indemnity x v − = δ θ, , .    is negative, because premium is set constant for a 
specific policy, and indemnity is monotonic decreasing in x. Thus the moral hazard effect 
is always positive.  
x v
 
To compare the optimal input levels with and without insurance,  define   
(with insurance),   (without insurance). From (3) and (4), we can derive 
) , ( P I x xi =
) 0 , 0 ( 0 x x =
(5)           ] [ )] 0 , 0 , ( ) 0 , 0 , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( [
) 0 , 0 , (
x
x










− + − =
′
σ ρ σ ρ σ
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Assume  ) 0 , 0 , (x η  is a concave function in x, which is true if  0 < xx q . Then  
(6)           () 0 0 , 0 , 0 ≤ ⇔ ≥ i x i x x x η ,         ( ) 0 0 , 0 , 0 > ⇔ < i x i x x x η   
The first term of (5) is the risk reduction effect of insurance. The second term is the moral 
hazard effect. Ramaswami (1993) proves that under the assumption of non-increasing 
risk averse utility function, if the input is risk-increasing (risk-decreasing), the risk 
reduction effect is negative (positive). Including the randomness of price makes this 
result is a little bit different: if the input is risk-increasing, the risk reduction effect is 
negative; while if the input is risk-decreasing, the sign of risk reduction effect depends on 
the coefficients. Therefore, the risk reduction effect tends to increase risk-increasing 
  7input use, while has an indeterminate influence on risk-decreasing input use. Since the 
moral hazard effect is always positive, the total impact of actuarially fair crop insurance 
on input use is indeterminate. 
 
After introducing the randomness of price, the two propositions brought up in 
Ramaswami (1993) now change into: 
Proposition 1: For all constant and decreasing risk averse utility functions and for an 
actuarially fair insurance contract, risk reduction effect tends to increase risk-increasing 
input use, but has an indeterminate influence on risk-decreasing input use.  
Proposition 2: The moral hazard effect tends to reduce input use. So the total impact of 
actuarially fair crop insurance on input use is indeterminate. 
 
A Numerical Simulation 
Based on the theoretical model, moral hazard effect and risk reduction effect are 
separated from the total insurance effect in the following way: 
Assume 
x
0: input choice with no insurance, 
x
1: input choice with ideal actuarially fair insurance (no information asymmetry, i.e. 
insurer observes farmer’s input use), 
x
*: input choice with real-world actuarially fair insurance (insurer doesn’t observe 
farmer’s input use), 
then  
*0 x x total insurance effect −= ;  
  810 x x risk reduction effect −= ;  
*1 x x moral hazard effect −= . 
What is worthy to be noticed here is the insurance policy is actuarially fair in the ex post 
sense. That is, the insurer and the insured have reached a Nash equilibrium, and there is a 
moral hazard effect, but no moral hazard. In another words, the moral hazard effect here 
refers to the difference between the first-best result and the second-best result on input 
use. 
   
We take nitrogen (N) fertilizer input and corn yield as an example. Fertilizer is typically 
considered a risk-increasing input (Ramaswami, 1993; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993). 
Optimal N input levels under the two types of insurance, ideal and an approximation of 
existing individual trigger revenue contracts (ITRC) are obtained by 3000 Monte Carlo 
simulations. The coefficients used for simulations are based on research in the upper 
Midwest on the response of corn to nitrogen.   
 
Assume there are numerous identical constant absolute risk-averse farmers in the market. 
They are assumed identical so that there is no adverse selection problem exists. Constant 
absolute utility function excludes the wealth effect on farmer’s optimal input using.   
 
The corn price is log-normally distributed and has negative correlation with yield with a 
correlation coefficient in the range of -.3 to -.6.  Assume there are 15 production 
functions corresponding to 15 states of nature with probabilities and parameters shown in 
Table 1. Each function takes a quadratic-plateau functional form as follows: 
  9(7)            if 
2 cx bx a q − + = x x < ;         
2 x c x b a q − + =   if   x x ≥      
The use of quadratic-plateau functional form is justified by some previous empirical work 
(Cerrato and Blackmer 1990, Bullock and Bullock 1994).   Corn price is assumed to be 
log-normally distributed with mean 2.50$/lb, standard deviation .50$/lb. The correlation 
coefficient between corn yield and price is assumed to be -.5. The N fertilizer cost 
.  lb w / $ 21 . =
 
Table 1. The parameters of production functions under 15 states of nature 
Group a  b  c  x   Prob (%) 
1 15  0 0 0 0.7 
2  22 0.46  0.0040  58 0.8 
3  29 0.54  0.0044  62 1.2 
4  34 0.66  0.0044  74 2.4 
5  38 0.74  0.0037  99 3.5 
6 42  0.82  0.0039  104  3.7 
7 46  0.88  0.0037  118  4.2 
8 50  0.93  0.0037  126  7.5 
9 54  0.98  0.0037  133  12.7 
10 58 1.03  0.0036  143  18.5 
11 62 1.08  0.0036  149  19.7 
12 66 1.13  0.0036  157  14.7 
13 70 1.17  0.0036  164  8.0 
14 74 1.21  0.0037  166  1.4 
15 76 1.24  0.0036  173  1.0 
 
Consider the following two actuarially fair revenue insurance policies.  
1)  A “real-world” actuarially sufficent insurance policy: 
1.  Insurer knows the production conditions, such as long-term weather pattern 
and soil type in a specific area, but has no ex ante information on farmers’ 
risk-averse type and their input use. The information set of insurer is 
  10represented as { , where d refers to the states of nature, corresponding 
productions functions and probabilities.  
} d
2.  Guarantee based on  ( ) acre lb level N optimal neutral risk x d q E / 130 , | = − = . 
3.  Coverage rate: 0.75. 
4. Premium:  . The 
insurance provider keeps adjusting the premium according to the indemnity he 
has paid during previous years until he finally be able to provide an actuarially 
fair policy. 
() |, E indemnity d indemnity incurred in previous years
 
2)   An ideal actuarially fair insurance policy: 
•  The information set of the insurer is represented as { } , dx, where x refers to 
the farmer’s actual input use. 
•  Guarantee based on  ( ) |, ' E q d x farmer s actual N input = , where x refers to 
farmer’s actual nitrogen use. 
•  Coverage rate: .75. 
•  Premium:  . Insurer observes 
farmer’s actual input use, and charges an actuarially fair premium rate 
according the actual input use. 
() |, ' E indemnity d x farmer s actual N input =
 
Based on the above assumptions, 3000 Monte Carlo simulations are conducted. Farmer’s 
choice set for nitrogen fertilizer use (lb/acre) is {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 
  11110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180}. It is set to be discrete for computational 
convenience.  The simulation results are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Nitrogen fertilizer use response to single commodity revenue insurance, based 
on 3000 Monte Carlo simulations 

































0 130  130  130  0 0 0 
.01 120  130  130  10  10 0 
.02 100  130  120  20  30  -10 
.03 70  120  110  40  50  -10 
* The coefficients .02 to .03 are used in Kramer and Pope (1981), Holt and Brandt 
(1985) as the cases of strongly risk aversion (Raskin and Cochran, 1986). 
 
 
The simulation result suggests 
•  Risk-reduction effect increases while moral hazard effect decreases nitrogen 
fertilizer use. That is consistent with Proposition 1 and 2. 
•  Total insurance effect, risk reduction effect and moral hazard effect tend to 
increase with the increase of risk aversion.  
•  Total insurance effect is positive because risk reduction effect overwhelms 
moral hazard effect under the simulation assumptions. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This study reviews the single input model for supply response to crop insurance provided 
by Ramaswami (1993), and examines the two propositions in that paper after introducing 
the randomness of price. With two random shocks (yield and price) the two propositions 
  12are slightly different from those in Ramaswami (1993). According the two propositions, 
total insurance effect on supply response is indeterminate. This is consistent with the 
mixed empirical results. This study also provides a numerical method to decompose the 
total insurance effect into a risk reduction effect and a moral hazard effect. The 
simulation result suggests the total insurance effect is economically insignificant, so are 
the risk reduction effect and moral hazard effect under mild risk aversion. Also the moral 
hazard effect is less significant than the risk reduction effect. However, this does not 
mean moral hazard is not a serious problem in insurance contract design. In this 
simulation, a coverage level of .75 is used. The moral hazard effect becomes larger if a 
higher coverage level used. Another assumption of the model is the insurance policy is 
actuarially fair. In the real world, it may take a long time for an insurance provider to 
obtain enough information to be able to provide an actuarially fair insurance. Sometimes 
he is never able to, because farmer’s type may change over time. Actually moral hazard 
is so important that it is considered an important reason for missing private crop 
insurance (Chambers, 1989). This study excludes adverse selection by assuming all 
farmers are identical. That is a more rigid than realistic assumption. It is usually hard to 
distinguish the two types of asymmetric information in empirical work. It might be very 
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